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JURY SENTENCING - GRAB-BAG JUSTICE
by
Charles W. Webster*
"'rRYING a man is easy, as easy as falling off a log compared
"Twith deciding what to do with him when he has been found
guilty."'
It has often been stated that the most significant advance which
could be made in the criminal jurisprudence of the State of Texas
would be to take the sentencing power away from the jury. Only
Texas and seven other states' give the jury discretion to determine
sentences in all cases, while the other forty-two plus the federal
system vest the power of sentencing in the court. This Article is
designed to determine whether there is any valid reason for continu-
ing the practice of jury sentencing in present-day law or whether (as
* Ph. B., Marquette University; L.L.B., University of Wisconsin; Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University; Member, Texas Council on the Administration of Justice. All
opinions expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Texas Council on the Administration of Justice.
' Justice Henry Alfred McCardie, cited in Guides for Sentencing, Advisory Council of
Judges of the National Probation and Parole Association (1957).
aSee Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2307 (1948); Va. Code Ann. § 19-624 (1949). See, e.g., Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 38, S 360 (Smith-Hurd 1935); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1811 (1956); Ky. Crim.
Code § 284 (Baldwin 1959). In addition, the jury is given discretion in death cases in the
following states: Alabama, Ala. Code tit. 14, § 318 (1940); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-453 (1956); Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2152 (1948); California, Cal. Pen.
Code § 190 (1959); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 40-2-3 (1953); Connecticut, Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-10 (1958); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. 5 26-1005 (1933); Hawaii, Hawaii
Rev. Laws § 291-5 (1955); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. 5 18-4004 (1947); Illinois, Ill. Ann.
Star. ch. 38, § 360 (Smith-Hurd 1935); Indiana, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3401 (1933); Iowa,
Iowa Code 5 690.2 (1958); Kansas, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-403 (1949); Kentucky,
Ky. Crim. Code 5 435.010 (Baldwin 1959); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413
(1957); Massachusetts (jury discretion except if murder was connected with commission
of rape or attempt to rape, then mandatory death sentence), Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
265, § 2 (1956); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. 5 2217 (1942); Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. 5
559.030 (1949); Montana, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 5 94-2505 (1947); Nebraska, Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-401 (1957); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. 5 16-200.030 (1959); New Hampshire,
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 585:4 (1955); New Jersey, N.J. Rev. Star. 5 2A:113-4 (1953);
New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-24-10 (1953); New York, N.Y. Pen. Law § 1045
(1944); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1953); North Dakota (no penalty ex-
cept if convicted for murder while serving a life sentence for murder), N.D. Rev. Code §
12-2713 (1943); Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01 (Anderson 1953); Oklahoma, Okla. Star.
Ann. tit. 21, § 707 (1951); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.010 (1957); Pennsylvania, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4701 (1945); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 11, § 23-1
(1956); South Carolina, S.C. Code § 16-52 (1952); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. 5
39-2405 (1956); Texas, Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1257 (1948); Utah, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-30-4 (1953); Vermont, Vt. Stat. § 2303 (1957); Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 18-31
(1950); Washington (life imprisonment unless jury specifically finds death penalty),
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.48.030 (1950); West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. 5 5917 (1955);
Wyoming, Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 6-54 (1951).
While the subject of the death penalty is beyond the scope of this paper, one cannot
wonder at the giving of this discretion to the jury. However, it may be better for society
to require that its representatives actually make the decision each time it must be made,
rather than to determine the imposition of the death penalty solely on the basis of the
crime committed.
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so often happens in the law) it has remained long after its reason
for existence has disappeared, solely because there has been no
organized effort to effectuate a change.
I. OUR COMMON-LAW TRADITION
The jury system as we know it came to us from our English fore-
bearers, and it has been with pride that the right to trial by a jury
made up of one's peers has been regarded as an important guarantee
of our liberty.' While there have been many theories advanced as to
the beginning of the jury system, legal historians seem to favor the
idea that it sprang from the early inquests used by Frankish kings
and brought to England in 1066 by the Norman invaders. The early
jury was used primarily as a means of getting information known
in the area but unknown to the traveling judge.4 In 1166, Henry II
gave instructions that in the future no man was to be brought to
trial unless first found guilty by "twelve knights, good and true."'
This action of Henry II was the beginning of the grand jury indict-
ment, which determined if the accused must stand trial.' After a
grand jury indictment was returned, which determined that the
accused must stand trial, he then was tried by ordeal,' wager of law,'
aThe Magna Carta, as construed in the 17th century, was thought to guarantee jury
trials. But that could not have been the case, for at the time the Magna Carta was assented
to in 1225, jury trial had not developed as a general procedural institution and for some
time thereafter it was still regarded by many Englishmen as a tyrannical innovation. Pluck-
nett, A Concise History of the Common Law 106-38 (1956). See also the guarantees
to trial by jury established in the United States Constitution, amends. VI, ViI.
"Thus, early juries were selected because of their knowledge of the facts while today
a juror is disqualified if he is personally aware of the facts. See Windeyer, Legal History
62 (2d rev. ed. 1957).
'Assize of Clarendon, 1166. This procedure was further extended by the Assize of
Northampton, 1175. See Stephenson & Morcham, Sources of English Constitutional History
76, 80 (1937).
' The grand jury today, in returning an indictment, merely returns an accusation, and,
generally speaking, the grand jury returns the indictment on a three-quarters vote. In ad-
dition, with a rare exception, the grand jury hears only the evidence of the state and is
not made aware of the defendant's contentions. Puttkammer, Administration of Criminal
Law 119, 127 (1953).
'Four kinds of trial by ordeal were in common use in England. The Ordeal by Fire
required the accused to carry a piece of hot iron for nine paces. The hand was then
wrapped for three days. At the end of the third day the bandage was removed; if the
hand had festered, it was determined that the man was guilty because it had previously
been requested that God keep an innocent man's hand clean of infection. The Ordeal by
Hot Water was similar to ordeal by fire in that the same routine was followed, except that
the accused was required to remove a stone from the bottom of a vessel of boiling water.
In the Ordeal of the Corsnade, the priest gave to the accused a one-ounce morsel of
bread or cheese which had been charged to stick in the man's throat if he were guilty.
When the Ordeal was by Cold Water the accused was bound and lowered into a pool of
water which the priest had consecrated and adjured to receive the innocent but to reject
the guilty. Therefore, if the man floated he was guilty; if he sank he was innocent. See
Windeyer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14-15.
'In Compurgation or Wager at Law the accused swore that he was not guilty and
he then called several of his neighbors to state upon their oath that the accused party's
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or trial by battle!
When ordeals were abolished in 1215, people who had been ar-
raigned by the grand jury were then tried by a petty or petit jury
made up of a group of men varying in number from twelve to forty-
eight." At first a unanimous verdict was not required, but, in view
of the fact that the juries were to represent the voice of the country
(which could speak in only one voice), unanimity soon became a
requirement. It was not hard to obtain a unanimous verdict, however,
for it became the custom to keep the juries locked up without food
or drink until they had arrived at a decision." Historically, jurymen
could be punished by the court for returning a verdict the judge con-
sidered incorrect. They could also be tried before a jury of twenty.-
four for returning an erroneous verdict. 2 However, since 16 7 0 '3 it has
been established that judges have no power to punish juries because
of disagreement with their verdicts, and since that time the juryman
has become the uncontrolled judge of the facts. From that time on,
with a few minor variations in the different states by statutes, the
oath was clean, i.e., that he was the sort of person who would not tell a lie under oath.
Although somewhat difficult to understand by modern standards, at this time in history
a man would hesitate to swear a false oath. His neighbors, if not convinced of his inno-
cence, might fear to support his oath because of their belief that the wrath of God would
be made manifest upon them and that misfortunes would follow such a false oath. Therein
lay the effectiveness of Compurgation. (Compurgation provides the historical setting for
the policy which has continued to modern times requiring all witnesses to be sworn.) See
Windeyer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12.
'Trial by Battle was also a way of determining the decision of God in the quarrels of
men. In some cases the parties to the suit fought their own battle; in others they were al-
lowed to hire champions to fight for them. Usually these battles were fought with weapons
similar to a pick-ax and if the accused could stand throughout the entire day until the
stars shone in the evening, it was determined that he had won his case. On the other hand,
if his adversary could make him cry "Craven" he was held to be guilty. This method is
believed to have been used last in Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & Aid. 405, 106 Eng. Rep.
149 (K. B. 1818) before Parliament repealed it in 1819. 59 Geo. III c. 46. See Windeyer,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 44-46.
"0 Even after the ordeals had been abolished a man still could not be forced to be tried
by his fellow-countrymen rather than by God. The accused was given the opportunity to
"stand mute" to the question "How will you be tried?" Where the accused did not answer,
the jury then decided if he were "mute by Act of God" or "mute of malice." If the de-
termination was the latter, the authorities then had to put pressure on the prisoner to com-
pel him to speak. In order to accomplish this, a barbarous torture called peine forte et
dure was used, where the accused person was tied to the ground and weights were placed
upon him until he either spoke out or died. The only advantage to the accused from peine
forte et dure was that he died an innocent man; therefore, his lands were not forfeited to
the crown. These rules were not abolished in England until 1870. See Windeyer, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 67-69.
" It should be pointed out that there was no prohibition at this time against members
of the grand jury also serving on the petit jury and it was quite common for the same
person to serve on both. This also helped towards unanimity, especially if the verdict were
guilty. See Windeyer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 67.
"3Windeyer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 61.
a Bushell's Case, cited in Windeyer, op. cit. supra note 4, at 61.
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jury came to be used as it is today. While the determination of guilt
or innocence has traditionally been a jury function, in only a few
states has the jury also been granted the power to fix the sentence
within limits established by the legislature."
Since the common law permitted the judge to determine the
punishment, this for a time became the procedure in Texas. Follow-
ing the formation of the Republic of Texas, the First Congress in
1836 enacted legislation which made no appreciable change in the
existing practice."5 For the ten years of the Republic, the power of the
judge to fix the penalty was not disturbed. The change to jury deter-
mination of the penalty was affected by one of the first laws passed
by the first legislature of the State of Texas in 1846, which em-
powered the jury to sentence the defendant in all criminal cases
except (1) capital cases and (2) cases for which punishment was
fixed by law."
Present law provides that the jury shall assess the penalty in all
cases where it is not absolutely fixed by statute. "If the plea is not
guilty . . . [the jury] . . . shall assess the punishment in all cases
where the same is not absolutely fixed by law to some particular
penalty."" If the accused pleads guilty and waives a jury trial, the
judge may affix the sentence.'"
II. PRESENT SCOPE OF DISCRETION
In order to point up the vagaries of the jury, the records of the
District Court of Dallas County for the years 1958 and 1959 have
been studied. The author has arbitrarily chosen the crimes of mur-
der, rape, and narcotics to point out the variation in sentences which
have been imposed by juries during this two-year period. As a com-
parison, statistics on the sentences imposed by judges for these three
crimes during the same period of time have also been compiled."
These statistics are as follows:
" See note 2 supra.
" I Gammel, Laws of Texas 540 (1898).
1Texas Laws, 1846, p. 161.
7 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 693 (1925).
"STex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 10A (1925).
"it is realized that to a certain extent the statistics on judicial sentencing are of no
value for comparative purposes because, in most of the cases, the sentence imposed was the
result of negotiation between the state and the defendant, and the end result has been horse




Disposition of Convictions for Murder, Rape, Narcotics, and
Related Offenses, Dallas County, 1958 and 1959.
Number Percentages
Jury Trial
Of Jury Of All
Convictions Convictions
Probation ------------ 0 0 0
Suspended Sentence ---- 5 5 1
Texas State
Penitentiary ------- 89 95 23
Total 94 100 % 24%
Jury Trial
Of Court Of All
Convictions Convictions
Plead Guilty (without jury)
Probation ----------- 68 24 18
Suspended Sentence ---- 47 16 12
Texas State
Penitentiary --------- 174 60 46
Total ------- 289 100% 76%
Totals-Both
Jury and Court ------- 383 100%
Chart I illustrates the fact that the juries do not know how properly
to use suspended sentences (5%), but that judges sometimes do
(16%). While juries are unable to probate a sentence, the judges
have occasionally used probation (24%) although a judge cannot
probate the sentence in any murder case.
Chart II
Heavy Convictions, Dallas County, 1958 and 1959.
Number of Percentage Sentences
Cases of Total
Convictions
25 yrs. 50 yrs. Life Death
or more or more
By Jury ---- 94 24% 30 21 12* 1
By Court .289 76% 13 6 -*
*Does not include 4 sentences of 99 years each.
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Chart II illustrates the fact that juries pass out heavier sentences.
Though they consider only 24% of the cases, they pass out 70% of
all sentences of 25 years and over, 78% of all sentences of 50 years
or over, and all of the life and death sentences. This tends to show
that their motivation is more one of vengeance than of rehabilitation.
It should be pointed out that the judge cannot assess punishment
in rape or any murder case. In non-capital felony cases, the judge
can assess the punishment only where a jury is waived and the de-
fendant pleads guilty. This arises because of the inconsistency which
exists between our probation laws and our suspended sentence laws.
Chart III
Various Penitentiary Sentences Imposed in Dallas County,
1958 and 1959, for the Crimes of Narcotics, Murder,
Assault-Attempt to Murder, and Rape.
Number Range Median Mode Mean
Narcotics
Jury --------- 15 2-life 13 15 18.4
Court* --------- 64 2-45 5 5 6.4
Murder
Jury --------- 31 5-death 25 life 52.5
Courtt -------- 4 2-5 3 5 4.0
Assault-Attempt Murder
Juryt -------- 12 5-15 15 15 11.8
Court*t --------- 38 2-15 5 5 6.0
Rape
Juryt -------- 16 5-life 30 none 41.4
Courtt -------- 10 4-99 35 none 44.2
*Does not include probated sentences.
tDoes not include suspended sentences.
Chart III illustrates the fact that when one throws himself at the
jury's mercy, the result is one of "grab-bag" sentencing. In the area
of narcotics, for example, jury sentences ranged from 2 years to life
for the same offense, and these sentences were imposed without any
knowledge of the characteristics of individual offenders. Compare
the narrower range of court sentences.
As can be seen from the foregoing, juries have been extremely re-
luctant to use suspended sentences and on a general average juries
are much more severe. The range in sentencing by the jury in
narcotics cases has been from 2 years to life. In murder cases the
range has been from 5 years to the death sentence. It is interesting
[Vol. 14
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to note that the median for murder has been 25 years and the arith-
metical mean 52.5. In rape cases the range has been from 5 years to
life, with the median being 30 years and the arithmetical mean 41.4.
The statistics merely show that the juries have in fact exercised
the discretion vested in them by the statutes. The statistics, of course,
do not and cannot reflect the basis for the exercise of this discre-
tion. The contention of this writer is that no matter how sincere the
jurors may be, jury imposition of sentences constitutes merely
"sanctified guessing." A criminal trial can not bring out reasons for
variation in sentencing, and it is solely the persuasive oratory of the
district attorney or defense counsel which determines the severity
of the sentence. This is playing games with human lives.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHANGE
No time need be spent discussing man's natural resistance to
change, nor the inherent conservatism of the Bar which fears repeal
of any law which it has mastered, regardless of its merits. The
argument most often advanced against taking the power from the
jury is that it would be turned over to the judges who, because of
their short tenure, must be politicians first and judges second. How-
ever, in many jurisdictions which vest sentencing power in the court,
the tenure of criminal judges is not materially different from the
tenure of such judges in Texas. The judges in these jurisdictions
seem to perform the function adequately even though they must
return to the electorate for re-election."0 While, as will be set out later,
20 In a recent survey conducted by the Dallas Morning News the question posed to the
jurors and attorneys polled was whether they would prefer the system in use in Texas or
the system used in the federal courts. It is interesting to note the loaded nature of the
question, which disregarded the fact that there are 42 states in which the judge imposes the
sentence. One of the major objections raised was that the federal bench is appointed for
life and is thereby immune from political pressure, while the four-year term of Texas dis-
trict judges makes such a situation impossible. See Dallas Morning News, Feb. 29, March
2, 6-9 (1960). Terms of office of criminal judges of the various American jurisdictions
are as follows: Alabama, 6 years, Ala. Const. art. 6, § 155; Alaska, 4, Alaska Comp. Laws
Ann. § 54-1-1 (1949); Arizona, 4, Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5; Arkansas, 4, Ark. Const. art.
7, § 17; California, 6, Cal. Const. art. 6, § 8; Colorado, 6, Colo. Const. art. 6, § 12;
Connecticut, 4, Conn. Const. art. 5, § 4; Delaware, 2, Del. Const. art. 4, § 3; District of
Columbia, 10, D.C. Code Ann. 5 11-753 (1952); Florida, 6, Fla. Const. art. 5, 5 7(2);
Georgia, 4, Ga. Const. art. 6, 5 2-3101; Hawaii, 4, Hawaii Organic Act § 80, 31 Stat.
141 (1900); Idaho, 4, Idaho Const. art. 5, § 11; Illinois, 6, Ill. Const. art. 5, § 12;
Indiana, 4, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 4-3201 (1946); Iowa, 4, Iowa Const. art. 5, § 5; Kansas,
4, Kan. Const. art. 3, S 3; Kentucky, 5, Ky. Const. § 129; Louisiana, 6, La. Const. art. 7,
§ 33; Maine, 7, Me. Const. art. 6, § 4; Maryland, 15, Md. Const. art. 4, § 3; Massachu-
setts, as long as commission provides, Mass. Const. ch. 3, § 82; Michigan, 6, Mich. Const.
art. 7, § 9; Minnesota, 6, Minn. Const. art. 6, § 4; Mississippi, 4, Miss. Const. art. 6, §
153; Missouri, 6, Mo. Const. art. 5, § 23; Montana, 4, Mont. Const. art. 8, § 12; Nebras-
ka, 4, Neb. Const. art. 5, § 10; Nevada, 4, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 3.050 (1951); New Hamp-
shire, as expressed in commission, N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 74; New Jersey, 5, N.J. Rev.
1960]
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it is not necessary, and may not even be advisable to vest the power
solely in the district judges, it cannot be believed that vesting this
power in district judges would produce a system inferior to the one
in effect.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLISHING
While it seems to this writer that the arguments stand out so
clearly they need hardly be stated, nevertheless an attempt will be
made to point out the fallacy of jury sentencing.
It seems abundantly clear that all offenders who commit the same
criminal act should not be punished alike."1 It seems equally clear
that reasons for imposing different sentences for like crimes are
matters which cannot be brought out in the course of the trial
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Thus, the jury
will probably be uninformed as to the factors which should be con-
sidered in arriving at a proper sentence. In addition, while the jury
is a vital procedural safeguard in representing society in the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence, by its very nature a jury which is
called upon to be unanimous in determining a single fact question,
guilt or innocence, is completely unprepared to determine a complex
question such as sentencing. In effect the jury is required to deter-
mine the degree of the defendant's guilt. Jury sentencing thereby
becomes a system of compromises on the part of the twelve men. Most
people would be shocked at the idea that, if half of the jury found a
man guilty and half found him innocent, they would then try to find
some lesser crime that was acceptable to all, but this practice is often
Stat. § 2A: 7-6 (1951); New Mexico, 6, N. M. Const. art. 6, 1 i2; New York, 14,
N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 4; North Carolina, 8, N.C. Gen. Stat. 5 7-41 (1953); North
Dakota, 6, N. D. Const. art. 4, § 104; Ohio, 6, Ohio Const. art. 4, § 12; Oklahoma,
4, Okla. Const. art. 7, § 9; Oregon, 6, Ore. Const. art. 7 § 1; Pennsylvania, 10, Pa.
Const. art. 5, § 15; Rhode Island, during good behavior, R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-2-2
(1956); South Carolina, 4, S.C. Const. art. 5, § 15; South Dakota, 4, S.D. Const. art.
5, § 15; Tennessee, 8, Tenn. Const. art. 6, § 4; Texas, 4, Tex. Const. art. 5, § 7; Utah,
4, Utah Const. art. 8, § 5 n.l.; Vermont, 2, Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 48; Virginia, 8, Va.
Const. art. 6, § 96; Washington, 4, Wash. Const. art. 4, § 6; West Virginia, 8, W.Va.
Const. art. 8, § 10; Wisconsin, 6, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 252.01 (1957); Wyoming, 6, Wyo.
Const. art. 5, S 19.
In many of these jurisdictions the tenure of sentence-imposing judges is not significantly
different from the tenure of Texas criminal judges. The judges in these jurisdictions are ap-
parently able to discharge their duty of sentence imposition effectively, even though they
must return to the electorate for re-election.
"5 Under our system we do not even follow the sage advice of the Mikado, who tells
us that
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To let the punishment fit the crime
The punishment fit the crime.
The Best-known Works of W. S. Gilbert, Halcyon House, Garden City, N.Y.
[Vol. 14
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utilized, in effect, when the jury engages in fixing a term of years
for a particular offense.
Two other aspects of jury sentencing must be considered. First
is the time-consuming aspect of arriving at the sentence. Informal
discussions with former jurors indicate that more of their time is spent
in determining the sentence than in determining the question of
guilt or innocence. In addition, one of the big areas of jury miscon-
duct has involved their exercise of the sentencing power."
V. SCIENTIFIC SENTENCING
There are three possible bases for punishment of a criminal act:
retribution, deterrence, and reformation.23 As the United States
Supreme Court has said: "Retribution is no longer the dominant
purpose of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of of-
fenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."24
It seems apparent that retribution no longer can be morally
justified in a modern Judaeo-Christian society, and that therefore
this may be ignored as a basis of sentencing.
Both deterrence and reformation, however, are important philo-
sophies of punishment and a judge, depending on the facts, may well
lean toward one or the other in imposing sentence. Modern criminal
jurisprudence calls for a scientific approach to sentencing, wherein
the judge is furnished a complete presentence investigation prepared
by a trained person prior to the time of imposition of sentence. 5 In
some respects a parallel might be drawn between the judge and the
physician, who bases his diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis on a
22 See Farias v. State, 322 S.W.2d 281 (1959); Salcido v. State, 319 S.W.2d 329 (1959).
See also Stout, The Defensive Philosophy of Criminal Justice in Texas, 27 Texas L. Rev.
792, 801 (1949).
23 Michael & Wechler, Criminal Law and Its Administration, Cases, Statutes and Com-
mentaries 6 (1940).
24 Mr. Justice Black in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1948).
" It is recognized that transferring the sentencing power to the court would not neces-
sarily eliminate disparity. One possible suggestion which might be used is vesting in the ap-
pellate court the power to review the sentence. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1066 (1953):
The appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgement appealed from, and
may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial. In either case, the cause must be
remanded to the court below, with proper instructions, and the opinion of the court,
within the time, and in the manner, to be prescribed by rule of the court.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2308 (1943):
In all criminal cases that now are, or may hereafter be pending in the Supreme
Court on error, the court may reduce the sentence rendered by the district court,
against the accused, when in its opinion the sentence is excessive, and it shall be
the duty of the Supreme Court to render such sentence against the accused as in
its opinion may be warranted by the evidence.
These statutes are illustrative of attempts by states to guard against such disparity.
A workable solution which takes mitigating and aggravating circumstances into considera-
tion of the sentence is often followed in civil law countries. See, e.g., Francisco, The Revised
Penal Code, art. 61, 62 (1958). Some advocates of reform have suggested that the jury
1960]
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complete medical history and physical examination of the patient.
Likewise, the judge should base his sentence on a complete report
of the defendant's entire background. The approach of California,
where neither the judge nor the jury imposes the sentence, is also
scientific. The law of that state delegates to a Board of Prison Di-
rectors the power to review any sentence imposed."0
VI. CONCLUSION
It is obvious from a study of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
crime reports and a reading of the daily newspapers that the fre-
quency of crime is increasing. It is also obvious that our present
system of sentencing is not acting either as a deterrent to crime or
as a means of rehabilitation. In view of the fact that 95% of all
persons in prison eventually return to society, diligent effort should
be made to find a means which will enable return of these people as
useful citizens rather than to prey upon society. It is submitted that
at least part of the reason for recidivism is the injustice rendered at
the time of sentencing. The prisoner, feeling that he has not been
fairly treated, harbors a desire to avenge himself upon the society
which he thinks has treated him unfairly. Disparity of sentence by
juries for the same crime cannot but create this feeling of injustice.
While there is no claim that scientific sentencing will be the panacea,
it is nevertheless submitted that it will produce a system of justice
superior to that found under our present laws. Scientific sentencing
should come closer to making the punishment fit the criminal and
thereby be individualized in nature.
While the California system may well be the ultimate answer, it is
submitted that it may be necessary for us to crawl before we can
walk. Our first advance toward the goal of individualized sentenc-
ing should be to remove the power from the jury.
be furnished the past criminal record of the defendant prior to imposition of the sentence.
A study of pre-sentence investigations prepared by competent probation officers easily points
out that there are many factors other than a man's past criminal record which should be
weighed before sentencing. See Guides for Sentencing, Advisory Council of Judges of the
National Probation and Parole Association, Appendix B, p. 67 (1957). No attempt has
been made in this paper to urge the best means for handling the sentencing of persons con-
victed of crime. To a certain extent the approach has been a negative one; namely, to
remove the power from the jury.
"SCal. Pen. Code SS 1168, 3000, 3020, 3023 (1941).
[Vol. 14
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